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By Douglas Creutz 
“Stock prices must reflect risk and future growth potential.  When they don’t, shams and 
frauds and even the honest are encouraged and enter the market and try to siphon off 
some of the largess.  So in a sense, a bull market is a fertile ground for short sellers – but 
only if they really, really do their homework.” 
 
- Manuel P. Asensio, Sold Short 
 
“You know what this column says about companies that pick public fights with short-
sellers: Hold onto your wallets. Such was the case when Enron CEO Jeff Skilling called 
money manager Richard Grubman an "a------" after Grubman pressed Enron's chief 
accounting officer with detailed questions about the company's balance sheet.” 
 
- Herb Greenberg, TheStreet.Com, April 18, 2001 (when Enron was trading at $61) 
 
 
I. Introduction 
To say that the capital markets are currently fixated upon the problems of 
accounting fraud, poor corporate governance, and general management malfeasance 
would be an understatement.  The collapse of equity markets over the past three years, 
beginning primarily as a decline in high-priced technology and “New Economy” stocks, 
has now spread through the market as a whole.  The stories of Enron, Worldcom, and 
Tyco have made headlines on a daily basis.  Trillions of dollars of investor capital has 
been wiped out, while confidence in the stock market and corporate America is at lows 
not seen since at least the mid-70s.  Just as it seemed impossible to lose money in the 
equity markets in the late 90s, so it now seems that stocks may never rise again. 
However, there are two sides to every trade.  Another phenomenon of the early 
2000s has been the emergence of hedge funds as serious competitors for investor capital.  
Many of these funds eschew the long-only mandate of the mutual fund industry and 
instead seek to balance their risks by shorting as well as going long.  In fact, some money 
managers operate primarily on the short side, identifying stocks that they perceive to be 
overvalued.  They especially look for situations where they believe that management is 
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being less than forthcoming in telling the truth about the company’s prospects.  At last 
count there was approximately $4.2 billion at work in short-oriented hedge funds.1 
The question this paper seeks to shed some light on is whether professional short 
sellers are effective at identifying corporate malfeasance before it is publicly revealed.  
By shorting the stock while it is artificially high, presumably they can make abnormal 
profits by covering once the malfeasance is revealed.  Recent work (Asquith and 
Meulbroek, 1995; Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, and Sloan, 1999; Farinella, Graham, and 
McDonald, 2001; Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan, and Balachandran, 2002) tends to suggest 
that short sellers do earn abnormal profits.  This paper attempts to go a step further and 
suggest a reason why short sellers are able to earn abnormal returns – in “short”, they are 
able to discover or intuit material information relating to corporate fraud.  They can then 
establish a short position before that information is fully priced into the market. 
The major task for a study of this nature is finding a group of companies that is 
defined as having engaged in malfeasance ex post without exposing the sample to bias on 
the part of the researcher.  To avoid this problem, we have used a sample of companies 
trading on the NASDAQ that settled class action lawsuits between November 1996 and 
June 2002.  These companies were identified from issues of the Securities Class Action 
Alert, via a proprietary database.  While settling a class action lawsuit alleging fraud may 
not actually equate to having committed fraud or other wrongful acts, we believe it is a 
reasonable compromise that avoids many problems in data set construction.  After 
analyzing the data, we find strong evidence that short interest increases significantly on 
average during the class period, i.e. the period during which the alleged malfeasance was 
ongoing but had not yet been publicly disclosed.  This observed increase persists even 
                                                 
1 “Short Sellers Sharply Scrutinize Companies”, USA Today, February 18, 2003.  
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after controlling for overall changes in NASDAQ market short interest over the class 
period.  We also find that cases where short interest increased significantly also generally 
have large increases in trading volume. This could be explained by two factors: either (a) 
the increase in liquidity is actually driving the increase in short interest, as higher 
liquidity drives short selling costs down, or (b) the “market debate” about the activities of 
the company is driving volume up at the same time that short interest is increasing.  
Finally, we also find that the companies that have the largest rise in short interest during 
the class period tended to have smaller drops in price after disclosure of the malfeasance.  
We believe this reflects the short seller’s role in market efficiency: as more people 
become aware of a possible fraud, and short the stock, the price of the stock is driven 
down towards its “correct” value. 
 
II. Short Selling – Objectives and Obstacles 
Short selling involves borrowing stock from a long holder and then selling it to 
another investor.  The short seller must eventually close the position by buying the stock 
back and returning the shares to the investor from whom they were originally borrowed.  
Short sellers generally have one of three objectives (Brent, Morse, and Stice, 1990):  
 Squaring out a long position to lock in a gain while avoiding capital gains 
taxes, also known as “shorting against the box.” 
 Hedging another position in a stock, for instance a long-call position, or 
constructing an arbitrage, for instance between two companies involved in a 
merger agreement. 
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 Speculative purposes, believing that a stock will decline on the basis of 
research and/or information that the short seller possesses and feels is not 
currently priced into the market.  The short seller may feel that the market is 
mispricing publicly known information, or that the public information on 
which the market pricing is based is incomplete and/or false. 
This paper is concerned with the third short-seller objective, and more particularly with 
the situation where the short seller is basing his position on the belief that material 
information has been omitted or withheld by the company in its financial statements and 
press releases. 
 Short selling generally involves more risk and higher cost than long positions.  
One reason for this is the asymmetrical nature of stock price distributions; they are 
bounded by zero on the low side but have no theoretical limit on the upside.  Hence a 
short seller can earn a maximum profit equal to their initial investment, but has no 
theoretical cap on their upside loss.  (Although no stock has ever actually gone to infinity, 
some of the dot-com stocks in the late 90s did a pretty good imitation.) 
 Short sellers also face procedural restraints.  The first of these is the “uptick” rule, 
meaning that a short can only be initiated if the most recent trade in the stock went in a 
positive direction.  This is intended to prevent waves of short selling from “artificially” 
driving down the price of the stock (though many have commented that no such 
restriction exists on the upside.)  A second restraint is the need to “locate” the stock, i.e. 
to find a long holder who is willing to loan the shares to the prospective short seller.  
These may be shares held in “street name” for a retail investor at a brokerage through a 
margin account, or shares loaned by institutional investors.  For stocks where shares are 
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in short supply for borrowing, prospective short sellers will face a fee to borrow the 
shares, levied by the broker.  After completing the short sale, the seller must leave the 
cash in his account as collateral, where it earns an interest rate that may be slightly 
discounted from prevailing market interest rates.  In addition, even after the shares have 
been located for the short sale, the shares can be called away if the original owner either 
sells the shares or transfers them out of the margin account.  This requires the short seller 
to find another borrowing source.  If that proves impossible, he will be “bought in”, that 
is, forced to buy shares at the prevailing market rate in order to cover his original short 
sale obligation.  If the stock has moved higher in the interim, this can be very costly.  The 
general phenomenon of short sellers being forced to buy back shares at higher prices is 
known as a “short squeeze” and is often anecdotally given credit for sharp, fast rises in a 
stock’s price. 
 Beyond the procedural obstacles facing a short seller, there are also other factors 
that can come into play.  Lamont (2003) details a number of methods by which 
companies “fight back” against short sellers.  He classifies these into three categories – 
“belligerent statements”, “legal actions”, and “technical actions.”  Belligerent statements 
generally involve little economic cost to the short seller, as “talk is cheap”.  However, 
legal action – generally lawsuits involving alleging price manipulation or libel – can 
certainly increase the costs of short selling, if only in legal fees.  The third category, 
technical actions, generally involves the company trying to deliberately engineer a short 
squeeze.  This is done either through public suggestions that shareholders withdraw their 
shares from margin accounts to prevent them from being loaned, or through attempts by 
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the company to move shares into friendly hands by having the company or management 
buy up large blocks of shares. 
 Given the difficulties, higher costs, and higher risks involved in short selling, one 
might expect that short sellers expect a higher return on their activities.  This would 
imply that high short interest should be a bearish indicator, since the presence of many 
short sellers in a security would imply negative expected returns.  Conventional Wall 
Street wisdom actually suggests that high short interest is bullish, either because the short 
sellers represent natural buying pressure when they eventually have to cover, or for more 
simple contrarian reasons.  Earlier research tended to suggest that short interest had little 
information content; Woolridge and Dickinson (1994) study returns and short interest at 
both the market level and on a sample of randomly-selected individual stocks, and 
conclude that short sellers did not earn abnormal returns.  However, Asquith and 
Meulbroek (1995) claim that random samples will tend to miss existing abnormal returns, 
since the vast majority of companies have very low short interest levels.  They focus 
exclusively on firms possessing high short interest levels, and find significant abnormal 
negative returns for these high short interest stocks.  Farinella, Graham and McDonald 
(2001) find similar results looking at a sample of NASDAQ stocks with high short 
interest, as do Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan, and Balachandran (2002).  Dechow, Hutton, 
Meulbroek, and Sloan (1999) find that short sellers tend to position themselves in stocks 
with low fundamental ratios (earnings/price and book/price), and that these firms tend to 
have systematically lower stock returns.  They believe that short sellers use these ratios as 
a proxy for temporary mispricing and/or evidence of other, unknown risk factors. 
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 Lamont’s (2003) study of anti-short selling activities by firms focuses on the 
abnormal returns of the stocks of these firms.  He finds significant monthly abnormal 
negative returns on the order of 2% - a figure that compounds to roughly 27% annually.  
Lamont concludes that: 
A notable feature of the data is that many sample firms are subsequently 
revealed to be fraudulent.  This paper has presented a rogue’s gallery of 
shady characters, ranging from Charles Keating to Adnan Khashoggi.  The 
evidence on subsequent stock returns suggests that in public battles 
between short sellers and firms, short sellers usually are vindicated by 
subsequent events.  The evidence suggests that short sellers play an 
important role in detecting not just overpricing, but also fraud.  Policy 
makers might want to consider making the institutional and legal 
environment less hostile to short sellers. 
 
We now turn to the question of whether short sellers are effective at identifying corporate 
fraud. 
 
III. The Data – Construction 
In order to examine the relationship between corporate malfeasance and short 
selling, we must first identify a group of companies that fit the fraud profile.  “Corporate 
malfeasance” can be broadly described as including the following:  
 inaccurate or fraudulent accounting; 
 withholding material information about the company’s future prospects for the 
purpose of keeping the stock price high (and not for legitimate business 
reasons); 
 illegal behavior on the part of management such as embezzlement; 
 in general, any acts that could negatively affect the stock price and are not 
disclosed by the company (whether intentionally or through ignorance.) 
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Obviously, constructing such a sample from scratch proves exceedingly difficult.  
Potentially, the researcher could comb through press releases covering a given period of 
time, selecting companies that experienced adverse price reactions due to disclosures of 
malfeasance.  However, such a method exposes the data set to explicit or implicit biases 
on the part of the researcher, and would undermine the credibility of the results. 
 Fortunately, an existing data set is available which solves these problems.  The 
database we use is limited to cases alleging fraudulent inflation in the price of a 
corporation’s common stock, and includes 357 securities lawsuits filed after December 
22, 1995 for which settlements were reported by June 2002.  Ideally, a company that 
chooses to settle a class action lawsuit alleging fraud would only do so if there was at 
least some merit to the plaintiff’s claims, though in fact some are probably settled solely 
due to the costs of contesting a lawsuit.  We assume for the purposes of this study that the 
companies in the database represent a group of firms that have engaged in some sort of 
malfeasance.  If, in fact, some companies have not, then this would only tend to weaken 
the patterns we expect to see in the data. 
 The question we seek to answer is whether short interest anticipates fraud. We 
will examine this question by detecting whether short interest increases during the period 
of the fraud.  In class action lawsuits the fraud period is defined as the class period, i.e., 
the period that the company’s alleged fraudulent activities took place.  The end of the 
class period generally corresponds to the date of the “curative disclosure” where 
management makes an announcement that corrects the fraud, e.g., corrects earnings 
misstatements, recalls a faulty product, etc.  Only shareholders who buy or own shares 
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during the class period are eligible for compensation, since they are the ones who 
presumably were deceived about the true value of the company by management’s actions. 
Our approach takes short interest prior to the beginning of the class period as the 
“normal level” of short interest, and compares that to the short interest just prior to the 
end of the class period (and the curative disclosure.)  If the end of class period short 
interest is significantly higher, then we may conclude, after controlling for other factors, 
that informed short sellers detected the malfeasance before it was announced to the 
market.  In particular, they established a short position expecting that when the 
malfeasance was revealed, the stock would move downward, and they would profit. 
The original database included 357 class actions with settlement dates ranging 
from November 1996 to June 2002.  The data we use for the study includes 168 class 
actions; the other 189 are excluded for the following reasons: 
 At the outset, we made the decision to conduct the study using NASDAQ-
traded stocks only, since monthly NASDAQ short interest and trading volume 
data were readily available through the nasdaq.com website.  This excludes 
121 settlements. 
 64 settlements are excluded because there is no short interest data available 
prior to the class period.  In the majority of these cases, the class period 
beginning date coincides with the company’s IPO date, and thus there is no 
trading prior to the class period.  A few other cases have class periods 
beginning prior to January 1995, which is the earliest date for which short 
interest data is available. 
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 4 more settlements are excluded because the class period is less than two 
months.  Monthly short interest data could not be used in these cases. 
These 168 datapoints cover 166 different companies; two companies are repeat offenders. 
 To account for other influences on short interest, we include the following 
additional data for the period under study: 
 Monthly company shares outstanding and stock prices, from the CRSP 
database; 
 Monthly NASDAQ market short interest, from Bloomberg. 
 Monthly NASDAQ market share volume and dollar volume trading data, and 
monthly NASDAQ market cap, from nasdaq.com 
The last figures are necessary because no total NASDAQ market share count data is 
readily available.  For this we use the following proxy: 
Estimated NASDAQ monthly market share count = NASDAQ monthly 
market cap / (NASDAQ monthly dollar trading volume / NASDAQ 
monthly share trading volume) 
Estimating total NASDAQ shares outstanding is necessary to generate a NASDAQ 
market short interest ratio for control purposes. 
 
IV. The Data – Characteristics 
Table 1 (see Appendix) gives some descriptions of the average, median, and 
standard deviation of (short interest / shares outstanding) for two dates (hereafter referred 
to as “percent short”).  The first, “beginning”, is the month immediately prior to the 
beginning of the class period; the second, “ending” is the month immediately prior to the 
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end of the class period.  On average, the increase from beginning to ending percent short 
is 64.8%; the median percent short increase is 107.8%.  Table 2 includes data on the 
distribution of class period lengths in the data, with an average class length of 
approximately 1 year. 
Table 3 gives the average and median percent declines in share price during the 
month in which the class action period ends, i.e. the month in which the malfeasance is 
disclosed.  With an average drop of over 40%, the rewards to perceptive short investors 
are generally substantial.  This establishes the benefit of being able to identify instances 
of corporate malfeasance. 
Table 4 gives a sense of how the short positions evolve over time; for each case, 
we measure the percent short at time-quartiles.  For instance, for a 12-month class period, 
we measure percent short at the 0-, 3-, 6-, 9-, and 12-month time intervals.  We then take 
the ratio of percent short at each time-quartile to the beginning of period statistic to 
convert the percent short to a relative measure.  The data in Table 4 tend to suggest 
gradually increasing short interest over time, which is consistent with a slow and 
incomplete dispersion of information through the market.  (Note that the average figures 
are heavily influenced by the presence a few outliers; cases with class action periods of 
less than 4 months are excluded.) 
 
V. Empirical Results 
In this section, we use a number of statistical tests to determine whether short 
sellers anticipate corporate frauds. 
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V.i) Paired t-tests 
 We first use a paired t-test to compare the beginning and ending percent short for 
all the class actions in our data.  We test the null hypothesis that the difference between 
the beginning and ending percent short is equal to zero.  This test yields a t-statistic 
defined as the difference in the mean beginning and mean ending percent short, divided 
by the square root of the pooled variance times (1/n1 + 1/n2).  The results of the test are in 
Table 5.  The T-statistic is –4.75, yielding a 1-tailed p-value of 2.15 * 10-6, allowing us to 
reject the null hypothesis with nearly absolute certainty.  Hence, it does appear that there 
is a significant increase in short interest for our companies during the class period. 
 One possible reason for this increase could be the generally increasing market 
short interest during the late 1990s; this would definitely show up in our data.  Therefore, 
we conduct another paired t-test where we measure relative percent short, defined as 
(company percent short) / (NASDAQ market percent short) at the beginning and end of 
the class periods.  This normalizes the data relative to overall market short interest 
changes.  The sample’s average beginning percent short is 54% higher than the market 
average, and ending percent short is 139% higher than the market average.  The results of 
the test are in Table 6.  For this test, the T-statistic is –4.41, yielding a 1-tailed p-value of 
9.30 * 10-6, still allowing us to reject the null hypothesis with near certainty.  Even 
adjusting for overall market short interest increases, there does appear to be something 
else going on which is driving short interest higher during the class period. 
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V.ii) Regressions 
To further examine the relationship of fraud to short interest, we use a regression 
of the natural log of the change in percent short on the following independent variables: 
 Length of class period, to see if longer class periods lead to higher increases in 
short interest; 
 Change in NASDAQ market percent short, for reasons specified above; 
 Change in stock price during the class period, to see if there are either 
momentum effects (increasing short interest as the price drops) or valuation 
effects (increasing short interest as the P/E or P/B ratios increase; since we are 
not looking at cross sectional data, and our individual cases have an average 
length of one year, we assume that the majority of the change in valuation 
measures is due to changes in price and not accounting measures) at work; 
 Change in shares outstanding, and change in share trading volume, for 
liquidity effects; 
 Market capitalization, for size effects; and 
 Size of settlement, as a proxy for the “severity of the fraud.” 
We use natural logs to scale a number of the variables, both to fix the problem of 
asymmetrical (truncated) distributions and also to reduce the effects of outliers on the 
regression.  The results of the regression are in Table 7.  The regression has an adjusted r-
squared of 19%, indicating the much of the variance in the dependent variable is 
unexplained by the independent variables. 
 Only two of the independent variables in the regression are statistically 
significant.  The first, change in NASDAQ percent short, has a coefficient of 3.0463 and 
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a p-value of 1.02 * 10-3.  This relationship is as we would expect; increasing market short 
interest indicates increasing short interest among the sample companies.  Note that the 
coefficient of 3.0463 indicates that the percent change in company short interest varies 
roughly as the cube of the change in NASDAQ short interest. 
The second significant variable is the change in trading volume, with a coefficient 
of 0.8556 and a p-value of 1.29 * 10-8.  Thus, there appears to be a very significant 
relationship between increasing trading volume and increasing short interest.  There are 
at least two (not mutually exclusive) possible explanations for this phenomenon: 
 The increased short interest is a liquidity-driven phenomenon.  Shorting costs 
decrease as liquidity rises; hence, if volume is increasing for some exogenous 
reason, then one might also expect short interest to rise. 
 The increased volume coincides with the increased short interest.  Companies 
that are less effective at concealing their malfeasance might be expected to 
attract high degrees of attention from investors and from the press.  As more 
investors consider the possibility of fraud, and establish short positions in the 
company, the “stock debate” as personified by trading volume increases.  
Conversely, if no one has figured out that fraud exists, volume continues 
along more or less unchanged.  This is also consistent with the recent 
phenomenon of short investors becoming more aggressive about broadcasting 
their beliefs in an effort to accelerate the process of market recognition of the 
alleged fraudulent behavior. 
The other independent variables are not significant at the 5% level.  For change in 
price during the class period, we also ran another regression (not shown) based on the 
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absolute change in price in case the momentum and valuation effects were offsetting each 
other in the data; however, the results were still not significant.  The insignificance of the 
length of class measure may initially seem a bit surprising, since our descriptive data 
showed generally increasing short interest at increasing time quartiles.  However, this 
makes some sense if you believe that the official announcement of fraud (the end of the 
class period) only occurs when enough people have already figured it out, i.e. “the jig is 
up.”  Hence, a longer class period may be indicative of a more successful fraud, where it 
has taken market participants longer to figure it out.  The expected short interest at the 
end of the class period for a longer fraud would not be expected to be larger than that of a 
shorter fraud.  Finally, the constant term indicates an expected 43.4% increase in short 
interest before taking into account the effects of the independent variables; however, it 
too was not significant at the 5% level 
 As mentioned above, the significance of the change in volume variable suggests 
that the increase in short interest could be due primarily to liquidity effects.  If this is true, 
then the additional short interest should have no “informational content”.  In other words, 
if short interest is rising because of increased liquidity, and not because informed short 
sellers are acting based on their perception of fraud at the target company, then the short 
sales should not be pricing any additional information into the stock, specifically 
information about the perceived fraud.  To test this, we use a regression of the one-month 
change in stock price around the curative disclosure date on the natural log of the percent 
change in short interest.  We also include the two significant variables from the prior 
regression (change in trading volume and change in NASDAQ short interest.)  Two 
results emerge from the data: 
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 The constant term has a p-value of 5.80 * 10-37, and indicates an expected 
decline in the stock price (prior to controlling for the effects of the 
independent variables) of 34.23%. 
 The change in company percent short variable has a coefficient of .0237 and is 
significant at the 5% level.  This result implies if the short interest doubles 
over the class period, then the stock will have a positive excess return (relative 
to the base predicted by the constant term) of +1.64%.  Neither of the other 
two independent variables is significant. 
This suggests that short sellers are in fact helping to price information about the 
fraudulent activities into the stock, since the stocks experiencing higher increases in short 
interest also experience relatively better price performance around the disclosure date. As 
short sellers “gang-tackle” a company that they believe is engaging in fraud, the price is 
depressed, and the subsequent drop in price after the fraud is officially revealed is 
lessened, since the stock price already partly reflects the fraud information. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Our results suggest that short investors do have at least some success in 
identifying companies involved in fraudulent behavior before the fraud is revealed.  The 
question of whether volume leads or merely coincides with increasing short activity in 
these instances should be examined in more detail.  However, we do believe that the 
relatively higher returns around the curative disclosure date that are coincident with 
higher increases in short interest support the argument that the increased short interest is 
information-based rather than liquidity-based. 
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If short investors are instrumental in helping to identify corporate malfeasance 
and properly price it into the market, then it is important that additional restrictions on 
short selling (as are often proposed in times of market difficulty) be resisted.  In fact, the 
markets might well be better off in terms of efficiency if existing restrictions were 
loosened or lifted, and short sellers were allowed to ply their trade more freely.  After all: 
Every informed investor who participates in the market makes the whole 
system that much more effective. 
 
- Manuel P. Asensio, Sold Short 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
Beginning Ending
% Short % Short
Average 3.5% 5.7%
Median 1.7% 3.4%
Std Deviation 4.7% 6.5%
Table 1: % Short Summary Statistics
 
 
 
 
Months N Months N
2 1 19 1
3 11 20 1
4 8 21 1
5 9 22 1
6 10 23 4
7 12 24 4
8 13 25 0
9 15 26 2
10 12 27 2
11 11 28 3
12 16 29 2
13 4 30 0
14 6 31 1
15 4 32 0
16 4 33 1
17 3 34 1
18 2 35 0
36 3
N 168
Average Length 11.9
Median Length 10.0
Table 2: Length of Class Period
 
 
 
20 
Average -39.1%
Median -40.8%
Std Deviation 26.1%
Table 3: Post-Disclosure Price Change
 
 
 
Beginning 1st Quarter 2nd Quarter 3rd Quarter Ending
Average 1.00 6.22 29.54 41.06 56.73
Median 1.00 1.02 1.24 1.32 1.62
Std Dev 0.00 52.51 265.77 404.14 515.35
N 156 156 156 156 156
Table 4: % Short Evolution, Relative To Beginning % Short
 
 
 
SIBegin SIEnd
Mean 0.0345               0.0568           
Variance 0.0022               0.0042           
Observations 168 168
Pearson Correlation 0.45
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0.00
df 167
t Stat -4.75
P(T<=t) one-tail 2.15E-06
t Critical one-tail 1.65
P(T<=t) two-tail 4.29E-06
t Critical two-tail 1.97
Table 5: T-test Paired Two Sample for Means
Comparison of Beginning and Ending Short Interest
Unadjusted
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Beg End
Mean 1.54         2.39         
Variance 4.43         7.05         
Observations 168 168
Pearson Correlation 0.47
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0.00
df 167
t Stat -4.41
P(T<=t) one-tail 9.30E-06
t Critical one-tail 1.65
P(T<=t) two-tail 1.86E-05
t Critical two-tail 1.97
Table 6: T-test Paired Two Sample for Means
Comparison of Beginning and Ending Short Interest
Relative to NASDAQ Market % Short
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.47
R Square 0.22
Adjusted R Square 0.19
Standard Error 1.72
Observations 168
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 7 136.89 19.56 6.63 6.93E-07
Residual 160 472.19 2.95
Total 167 609.08
Coefficients Std Err t Stat P-value
Intercept 0.3605 0.2819 1.28 0.20
Length of Class Period -0.0283 0.0195 -1.45 0.15
LN Chg NASDAQ % Short 3.0463 0.9100 3.35 1.02E-03
LN Chg Price 0.1984 0.2017 0.98 0.33
LN Chg Shrs -0.3962 0.4466 -0.89 0.38
LN Chg Volume 0.8556 0.1427 6.00 1.29E-08
Market Cap 4.54E-08 1.06E-07 0.43 0.67
Settlement -4.17E-09 5.66E-09 -0.74 0.46
on Multiple Variables
Table 7: Regression of Change in Company % Short
22 
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.21
R Square 0.05
Adjusted R Square 0.03
Standard Error 0.26
Observations 168
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 3 0.52 0.17 2.62 0.05
Residual 164 10.88 0.07
Total 167 11.40
Coefficients Std Err t Stat P-value
Intercept -0.4191 0.0252 -16.61 5.80E-37
LN Chg Company % Short 0.0237 0.0116 2.04 0.04
LN Chg NASDAQ % Short 0.1199 0.1288 0.93 0.35
LN Chg Volume 0.0099 0.0218 0.45 0.65
Table 8: Regression of 1 Month Change in Company Share Price
Around Curative Disclosure Date on Multiple Variables
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